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This paper investigates the impact of equity markets and top incomes on art prices. Using 
a newly constructed art market index, we demonstrate that equity market returns have had 
a significant impact on the price level in the art market over the last two centuries. We 
also find empirical evidence that an increase in income inequality may lead to higher 
prices for art, in line with the results of a numerical simulation analysis. Finally, the 
results  of  Johansen  cointegration  tests  strongly  suggest  the  existence  of  a  long-run 
relation between top incomes and art prices.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Unless cast in platinum and covered with diamonds, as in the case of a 2007 Damien Hirst 
sculpture, a work of art has little intrinsic value. Nevertheless, works of art have from time to 
time fetched shockingly high prices, at least from the perspective of ordinary wage earners. The 
highest amounts have been paid for creations of deceased artists, but also living artists – Hirst 
being the exemplar – have commanded multi-million dollar or pound sums for their work. It is 
still largely a puzzle what determines these prices, and their pattern over time.  
Mandel (2009) argues that “it is the dynamic demand for art that is the only meaningful 
driver of investment returns”. He further points out that this demand may primarily be driven by 
a savings motive, as in his own theoretical framework, but also by changes in income. Indeed, at 
auctions, the price of an art object is only limited by how much collectors are willing and able to 
spend on it. When individuals‟ buying power rises, this can be expected to lead to higher art 
consumption, and thus to a higher price level in the art market. However, given the relatively 
fixed and limited supply of (high-quality) artworks, how wealthy the wealthiest are may matter 
more  to  the  determination  of  art  prices  than  total  wealth.  The  Economist  (2006)  puts  it  as 
follows: “Trophy asset prices may be a function of the huge dispersion of incomes. What is the 
point of being rich if you cannot drink the finest wines while gazing at the world's most famous 
artworks on the walls of your penthouse flat?” This is especially relevant because many high net 
worth individuals seem to be attracted to art assets, and often consider investing a considerable 
part of their wealth in it (Cap Gemini, 2008). 
One way to measure changes in wealthy individuals‟ buying power, is to look at stock 
market  returns.  Equities  are  typically  held  more  widely  among  the  most  affluent.  Without 
explicitly  making  this  point,  a  number  of  studies  (cf.  Section  2)  have  indeed  looked  at  the 
relation between stock market movements and art market trends. In this study, we extend this 
work over a much longer time frame, starting our study in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
By doing so, we may benefit from the fact that, at least in the earlier periods of our time frame, 
the art market was much less globalized, enabling us to calculate a less noisy measurement of the 
correlation between the equity market and the art market than has previously been possible.   4 
Moreover, we dissect equity returns into capital growth and dividend yield in order to establish 
which type of equity returns has an effect on art prices. 
A complementary approach to proxying for collectors‟ ability to purchase art consists of 
studying the evolution of top incomes over time, especially if the highest incomes also go to the 
wealthiest individuals. The simple simulation model in Section 3 of this paper, which builds on 
previous work by Goetzmann and Spiegel (1995), shows how changes in the total income in the 
economy, the income distribution, and the population of art collectors may impact on art prices. 
We also empirically investigate the links between total income and its distribution on the one 
hand and art prices on the other, relationships which have not been analyzed before. 
We utilize a repeat sales methodology that incorporates a noise reduction technique to 
construct an annual art price index since 1765, based on art auction transaction data from a 
historical resource and an online sales database. Since the initial selection of artists conforms to 
British taste, and nearly all the art sales considered took place in London, we relate our GBP-
denominated art price index to British equity market and income series. Our results show that, 
over the period 1830-2007, there is a strong positive relation between equity market and art 
market movements. Lagged equity capital changes show significantly positive correlation with 
changes in art prices. The effect is robust to several alternative specifications. Next, we also find 
evidence of a relation between income inequality and art prices over the period 1908-2005, the 
time frame for which the income inequality data are available. The significance of this result is 
largely driven by the large variation in the British income distribution during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Finally, we demonstrate the existence of a robust cointegrating relationship 
between top incomes and art prices.  
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of respects. First, it constructs a novel 
annual long-run art price index, which is used to estimate the relationship between art and the 
stock market. The results clarify previous ambiguous evidence on the impact of equity markets 
on  art  prices,  measured  over  shorter  time  windows.  Second,  this  paper  sheds  light  on  the 
fundamentals of art prices; more specifically, this is the first study to investigate the interaction 
between income, inequality, and art prices. Third, it adds additional evidence to the growing 
literature on wealth effects and luxury consumption.   5 
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines  the  relevant 
literature on art prices, stock market wealth effects, and the market fundamentals of real assets. 
Section 3 outlines a simple model that relates total income and income inequality to art prices, 
and shows simulation results. Section 4 presents the data for our empirical part, while Section 5 
gives an overview of our results. Section 6 includes a number of robustness checks. The final 
section concludes.  
 
2. Related literature 
 
Since  the  first  studies  by  Anderson  (1974)  and  Stein  (1977),  an  expanding  literature  has 
investigated the returns to art investments. For example, using different estimation techniques 
and ever-larger auction sales datasets, Baumol (1986), Pesando (1993), Buelens and Ginsburgh 
(1993), Goetzmann (1993), Mei and Moses (2002), Campbell (2008), Pesando and Shum (2008), 
and Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009a) have studied the price appreciation of art over time, and 
compared art returns to those on financial assets. In addition, researchers have focused on a 
number of art market „anomalies‟.
1 We refer to Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) and Ginsburgh et 
al. (2006) for more complete reviews of the literature on art auctions, prices, and price indices. In 
a recent contribution to the  field, Mandel (2009) demonstrates how a utility dividend derived 
from conspicuous art consumption may affect art returns in a consumption -based asset pricing 
model. 
There is relatively little work on the link between the art market and the broader 
economy, despite the anecdotal evidence that highlights the importance of   the relationship. 
Goetzmann (1993) shows that art has a positive beta with respect to the stock market over the 
very long term. In contrast, however, Mei and Moses (2002) report a correlation coefficient of 
merely 0.04 between the S&P 500 and their art index (annual real returns, 1950-1999). Pesando 
                                                 
1 Anomalies that have been identified in the art market include biases in presale estimates (Mei and Moses, 2005), 
violations of the law of one price (Pesando, 1993), lower returns for items that have been bought in (Beggs and 
Graddy, 2008), and anchoring effects (Beggs and Graddy, 2009). Many authors have also investigated whether there 
is a “masterpiece effect”, in the sense that better art makes a better investment, as first put forward by Pesando 
(1993), but the evidence is conflicting.    6 
and Shum (2008) find a correlation of 0.21 between the same stock index and their index for 
modern prints (semi-annual real returns, 1977-2004). Some of these differences may be due to 
the use of different intervals of observation and estimation, or to drawbacks of the repeat-sales 
regression, the method commonly used to build art indices. The low correlations may also be 
caused by a focus on U.S. stocks, while the art market has become a global trading place over the 
last few decades. Indeed, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009a), using a hedonic pricing approach, 
report a much higher positive correlation (0.38) between a global art price index and the returns 
on a global stock index (annual real returns, 1951-2007), than between the same art index and the 
S&P 500 (0.19). 
Correlations may not completely capture financial market wealth effects, for different 
reasons. First, most art indices aggregate pricing information over a calendar year while the 
financial returns are normally year-to-year changes in daily (or continuously) updated indices. 
This leads to non-synchroneity in the measured returns. Second, it may take some time before 
the wealth created in financial markets finds its way to art markets. Therefore, different authors 
have looked at the lagged relation between investor wealth and art prices. Goetzmann (1993) 
finds that, at least between 1900 and 1986, art prices follow stock market trends. Also Chanel 
(1995) and Worthington and Higgs (2003) present evidence that stocks markets Granger-cause 
art  prices.  However,  Worthington  and  Higgs  (2004)  point  out  that  the  “exact  strength  and 
persistence” of this relationship remain unclear. Moreover, the interaction between wealth and 
art prices over the longer run is still unclear. For example, Ginsburgh and Jeanfils (1995) find no 
long-term impact of stock markets on art markets. Similarly, Worthington and Higgs (2003) and 
Chanel (1995) conclude that it is hard to make long-run forecasts of art prices. It is important to 
note that, up until now, the art markets literature has typically not considered proxies for changes 
in investors‟ wealth other than financial market movements. 
While the issue of art as a financial asset has long been of interest to scholars interested 
in  the  role  of  art  in  the  economy,  a  broader  economic  issue  is  the  relationship  between 
consumption  and  the  behavior  of  asset  prices  (Campbell,  1999).  Standard  pricing  models 
typically assume the existence of a single “representative investor” – who consumes aggregate 
consumption – in the economy. However, motivated by the failure of the consumption CAPM to 
explain the relationship between aggregate consumption and equity prices, recent research has 
relaxed that assumption and taken into account the concentration of financial wealth in a small   7 
cohort  of  investors.  Poterba  (2000)  argues  that  one  would  expect  the  strongest  relationship 
between consumption and asset prices among the households that own the majority of all stocks. 
As a large share of the consumption of these households typically concerns luxury goods, this 
would imply a solid link between stock market wealth fluctuations and luxury spending. With 
respect to durable luxury goods in inelastic supply, such as art and wine, Poterba (2000) notes 
that the concentration of stock ownership and associated wealth gains in the 1990s led to an 
increased demand for such goods, which in turn resulted in “significant price appreciations”. 
Empirically, Aït-Sahalia et al. (2003) find a strong correlation between stock market returns and 
luxury consumption, and show that this result goes far in explaining the equity premium puzzle. 
Likewise,  Hiraki  et  al.  (forthcoming)  provide  compelling  evidence  that  such  a  “luxury 
consumption hypothesis” is valid in the art market. The authors use data on stock market returns, 
import/export flows, and art prices to show that positive wealth shocks to Japanese investors 
affected their art purchases in the 1980s, lifting the price level in the art market. 
Another related  literature is  that on the fundamentals  of  real  estate, one of the most 
important classes of real assets. The studies in this field have at times related house prices to per 
capita income, for example to investigate whether real estate can be considered overpriced (Case 
and  Shiller,  2003).  Recently,  some  authors  have  also  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the 
distribution of income in determining price levels. For example, Nakajima (2005) shows that 
rising earnings inequality in the United States may have been an important factor in the rise of 
real estate prices in the second half of the twentieth century, through an increased demand for 
precautionary savings that made the housing asset more attractive than financial assets. More 
directly related to the effects we are interested in here, Gyourko et al. (2006) demonstrate that 
“the thickness and length of the right tail of the income distribution” can have an important effect 
on real estate prices. In places that are desirable, but where little new housing is constructed, 
high-income families will outbid lower-income families for scarce housing, effectively driving 
up prices. Prices will thus rise faster when the population or income inequality increases. The 
authors claim that “in this sense, living in a superstar city is like owning a scarce luxury good”. 
In a similar spirit, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (forthcoming) show how the increase in house 
price dispersion in the United States over the last three decades can be explained by increases in 
the cross-sectional productivity dispersion (which directly translates into wage dispersion in their 
model). The simulation model in the next section makes clear how population growth, changes in   8 
total income, and shocks in income inequality may affect prices in the art market. In contrast to 
the situation in the real estate market, where there are important spatial differences in supply 
elasticity, the supply in the art market is almost completely fixed.  
 
3. A model of income (inequality) and art returns 
 
We develop a model of income and art prices (subsection 3.1), which is then used to simulate the 
effects of changes in the income distribution (subsection 3.2). Our model is based on Goetzmann 
and Spiegel (1995), who study private value returns in the art market. While a global risky asset 
portfolio is the primitive in the original model, we focus on personal income: we assume that an 
art collector buys art out of his income in each period, as he builds up his collection over time. 
Income  is  assumed  to  include  both  investment  and  employment  income.  In  contrast  to 
Goetzmann and Spiegel (1995) we allow for increases in the population of art collectors. In 
addition, in order to make our simulations exercise more realistic, we model the transactions in 
the art market as outcomes of second-price auctions.  
   
3.1. The model 
 
The private valuation Vijt that a collector i has of artwork j in time t is defined as: 
t it ij ijt m V                    (1), 
where mt is the total global income at time t, γit is the fraction of total income earned by investor i 
in time t, and λij is the fraction of his income that i is willing to spend on object j. Vijt reflects the 
maximum price collector i is willing to pay. The works are sold through an English ascending-
bid auction: the collector with the highest valuation wins the auction, but the price paid is equal 
to  the second-highest  valuation.  When we assume that there  are  Nt collectors in  time  t,  the 
private valuation of object j of the winning bidder w is therefore equal to:  
] ,..., 1 , [ max
*
t ijt i t wt wj wjt jt N i V m V V             (2).  
However, the price Pjt paid for object j is equal to underbidder u‟s private valuation:   9 
] ,..., 1 , 1 ,..., 1 , [ max t ijt i t ut uj ujt jt N w w i V m V P              (3). 
Assuming u(b) and u(s) represent the underbidders at the date of purchase, b, and the date of 
sale, s, the price appreciation of object j between purchase and sale can be expressed as follows:  
b b b u j b u
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In each period, every painting comes on the market with a probability equal to p. All works are 
offered to the Nt art collectors at that point in time. The population of art buyers increases by a 
number n in each period. The growth rates in per capita income are random draws from a normal 
distribution with mean and standard deviation both equal to φ > 0. λij, which reflects collector i‟s 
personal taste of work j and does not vary over time, is drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean and standard deviation ψ > 0.
2 The variable is also  censored at 0 and 1. We consider Z 
works of art. 
We construct a repeat sales art price index from the simulated transactions in the model, 
via the following equation:  
    X R                 (6),  
where R is a vector of log returns, X is a matrix of dummy variables equal to 1 for all t for which 
b < t ≤ s for each observation (and zero otherwise), and μ is a vector of log geometric return 
estimates that can be used to construct the index. We use the exponents of μ to build our indices, 
in line with, for example, Ginsburgh et al. (2006).
3  
 
                                                 
2 It is clear from equation (1) that λ serves to break the otherwise perfect correlation between personal income and 
willingness-to-pay. Ceteris paribus, greater variation of λ (at least between zero and one) implies a relatively smaller 
role  for  income  in  our  model,  especially  when  the  number  of  bidders  is  small.  However,  in  our  simulations, 
choosing a larger value for ψ yields qualitatively very similar results. 
3 In Section 4, we will correct our coefficients for the bias introduced by the concavity of the log. There is less need 
for such a correction in our simulations. In any case, it would not change our conclusions.    10 
3.2. Simulations 
 
We simulate an art market, and examine how the art price indices relate to the global changes in 
income. We first generate a series of average per capita income data over 20 periods, putting the 
first differences‟ mean and standard deviation (φ) equal to 0.05. We generate this time series of 
changes in income once and subsequently keep it fixed throughout our art market simulations. 
We assume that the personal taste variable λij has a mean and a standard deviation (ψ) of 0.15. 
We put the number of artworks (Z) for which we follow prices, i.e. the supply side of the art 
market, equal to 50. We assume that every artwork is auctioned off in every period, thus p = 1, 
but the seller can simply buy the item back if he still has the highest valuation. In other words, 
we consider buy-ins as transactions at the second-highest valuation in the market. In the first 
period, the number of collectors (N1) is equal to 20, and this number grows with n equal to 2 in 
each period. In each period, total income is equal to the average per capita income times the 
number of collectors. In the first scenario, each investor gets a share (γit) of total income that is 
drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and twice the average per capita income. This 
share stays fixed for each investor until t = 10. After the tenth period, there is a shock in the 
income  distribution,  leaving  everyone  with  an  equal  income  (i.e.  the  generated  per  capita 
income) from t = 11 until t = 20. Scenario 1 is thus that of a decrease in income inequality. In a 
second scenario, everyone starts with the average per capita income, but as from t = 11, the share 
of total income of each investor is again drawn from a uniform distribution. Scenario 2 is thus 
the opposite of scenario 1: inequality increases. Simulations for both scenarios are repeated 100 
times, starting from the same randomly generated income time series. We also repeat the analysis 
with n, i.e. the increase in the population of art collectors per period, equal to 5 instead of 2, 
which indicates a more substantial growth of the market. The simulation results are shown in 
Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 shows the randomly generated per capita income index, which is equal over both 
scenarios (in Panels A and B) and all art market simulations. The same panels also include the 
average art price indices for the two values of n, the growth in the number of art collectors. All 
index values are put equal to 1 in the first period; the scale is logarithmic. Not surprisingly, we   11 
observe an almost perfect correlation between the art price indices and the per capita income 
index when there are no shocks to the income distribution. Since total income is equal to the 
linearly increasing number of collectors times the average income in every period, this also 
implies a very strong relation between art prices and total income. However, for the first ten 
periods, art prices are higher in the first scenario, where the total income is distributed unequally, 
than in the second scenario, while the opposite is true for the latter half of our time frame. We 
also see a clear drop in prices in Panel A after the introduction of identical incomes for everyone 
between t = 10 and t = 11, and a sharp rise in art prices in Panel B after the income distribution 
becomes more unequal. In short: income inequality induces higher art prices.  
We also learn from Panels A and B that art index values are higher when the inflow of 
collectors into the market is larger, i.e. when n is higher. Panels C and D highlight one reason for 
this. For each of the first ten periods, these panels show the evolution of the average private 
valuation of the winning bidder as a fraction of total income (i.e. V
*/m, or λwγw), with the average 
relative valuation over all transactions in the first period normalized to 1. It is clear that we will 
see  stronger  increases  in  the  winning  bidders‟  relative  valuations  when  more  collectors  are 
flowing into the art market, since this creates a larger chance that someone with a very high 
private valuation of an art object enters the market. We find weaker increases in art values over 
time when the income is distributed evenly (Panel D); in this case, since everyone has the same 
share of total income γ, the increase is solely driven by changes in the winning bidders‟ λ. 
 However, there is also another, less straightforward mechanism driving art price trends 
in our simulation, stemming from the second-price set-up. Panels E and F present the average 
proportion of the price paid to the valuation of the winning bidder (i.e. P/V
*). In Panel E, in the 
first period, the winning bidder has to pay on average less than 80% of his own private valuation 
to buy the work, but this percentage generally increases over time. Again, the increase is higher 
when more art buyers enter the auction market. Not surprisingly, this proportion is higher when 
incomes are identical for everyone (Panel F), but even then we see an increase over time. 
Our model thus predicts that art prices will rise with (average and total) income and – 
when controlling for income – with income inequality. Cross-sectionally, we would also expect 
to see stronger price increases where the population of art collectors grows more strongly. In the 
next section, we will focus on the first two predictions. The third prediction falls beyond the   12 
empirical scope of this paper due to the fact that we limit ourselves to data from one country 
(with a rather stable growth in population).  
 
4. Data  
 
In this section, we first construct a long-run art price index based on repeated sales information 
extracted from Reitlinger (1961) and the Art Sales Index (subsection 4.1). Since our art market 
index is mainly built on London sales, and is expressed in British pounds, we also collect equity 
market  and income data for Great  Britain (subsection 4.2).  Insofar as  it  was  mainly  British 
individuals  who  bought  the  considered  artists  at  British  auctions  over  our  time  frame,  this 
procedure seems justified.
4 Tests for stationarity, descriptive statistics, and correlations between 
our variables are discussed in subsection 4.3. 
 
4.1. Art prices 
 
We start by building a long-term art price index. To do so, we go back to the auction sales data 
collected by Gerard Reitlinger in his 1961 book „The Economics of Taste‟, which was the first 
book in a series of three, and investigated the history of the British paintings and drawings 
market. The artists whose sales are listed in Reitlinger mostly conform to English standards of 
taste; Guerzoni (1995) reports that Reitlinger took into account sales of the “most important and 
prestigious  collections”.  All  transaction  prices  in  Reitlinger  (1961)  are  expressed  in  British 
pounds. Reitlinger‟s data have previously been used to calculate the returns on art by, amongst 
others, Anderson (1974), Baumol (1986), and Goetzmann (1993). In line with these studies, we 
identify all repeated sales within Reitlinger‟s book. (Reitlinger adds a short note, such as “see 
[year]” or “£[amount] in [year]”, to many transactions, which makes it possible to correctly 
                                                 
4 Of course, many of the great American collections of European art had already been formed by the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and the art market became more integrated over the course of the second half of the twentieth 
century. If anything, this will work against finding significant results when solely utilizing British data. In Section 6, 
we will also include American data in our analysis as a robustness check.    13 
identify repeated sales.) This gives us a dataset of 1,096 sales pairs until 1961, excluding buy-
ins. We then look up all 6,661 works listed in Reitlinger‟s book in the dataset constructed in 
Renneboog and Spaenjers (2009a), which contains more than one million transactions from the 
online  database  Art  Sales  Index  [http://www.artinfo.com/artsalesindex]  since  the  1920s  until 
2007,  and  try  to  identify  resales  of  those  same  works  in  Great  Britain.  We  only  classify  a 
transaction as a resale when there is a unique match of a non-ambiguous title, which occurs in 
253 cases.
5 In total we thus end up with a dataset containing 1,349 repeated sales. Since the data 
are very sparse for the first decades covered by Reitlinger, we delete the thirteen pairs for which 
the purchase occurred prior to 1765. This leaves us with 1,336 repeated sales.  
There are some well-documented selection issues with the data. First, Reitlinger included 
a  disproportionate  high  number  of  sales  from  Christie‟s  London.  However,  if  the  sales  at 
Christie‟s were representative for the higher end of the British market, this does not have to be a 
major problem. Second, Reitlinger also included relatively more artists that were famous in the 
beginning of the 1960s. The addition of transactions since the publication of the book, which 
affect the estimation of the whole index, should alleviate concerns about a potential upward bias. 
Third, in his  critical review of the Reitlinger  data series,  Guerzoni  (1995) shows that some 
transactions in between sales pairs seem to be missing. However, this is also the case in other 
repeated sales studies, and should not be expected to impact our index strongly. A more general 
concern is the survivorship bias in the art market. Simulating an art investment portfolio, without 
requiring resale, Goetzmann (1996) shows that survivorship issues can put a significant upward 
bias on estimated returns. However, insofar as this bias does not change significantly over time, 
this is not a major problem in the context of our research, since we are not focusing on the 
average long-term return, but on what determines the variation in art returns over time.  
It is important to stress that, despite the caveats outlined in the previous paragraph, the 
Reitlinger data still constitute a unique overview of auction sales since the end of the eighteenth 
                                                 
5 We classify a transaction in the Art Sales Index as a match to a sale in Reitlinger‟s list if we find strong evidence 
of the existence of only one work with the same title by the same artist. Also, we exclude objects with attribution 
classifications and with very general titles (or titles that point to a much-used subject of the artist), and objects that 
went to museums according to Reitlinger. Additionally, for the last ten years of our time frame, we can consult the 
provenance of the  work in the online catalogue description on  http://www.invaluable.com and delete a limited 
number of observations, for which the ownership history contradicted the original classification from our dataset.    14 
century. Also, the art price index is a means to an end here. Our use of the Reitlinger data and the 
repeat-sales methodology is a function of our intention to examine very long-term trends in 
income and asset market behavior. For shorter time frames, return series can be estimated more 
precisely, for  example via a hedonic approach that uses characteristics  data not  available in 
Reitlinger (1961). 
To get an estimate of the index μ over T periods based on N repeated sales observations, 
we follow the Bayes formulation of a repeat sales regression, which imposes some additional 
restrictions on the estimation, outlined in Goetzmann (1992, 1993): 





















               (7), 
where X again is a N x T matrix of dummy variables indicating the holding period for each 
object, the weights in Ω are the times between sales, and R is the N-dimensional vector of logged 
returns. Additionally, J is a matrix of ones, and κ is a constant that divides the variance of the 
residual error by the variance of the index: 





                  (8). 
We approximate κ by first running a simple GLS repeat sales regression on our data, which 
provides  us  with  estimates  of  σ  and  σμ.  The  Bayes  formulation  avoids  spurious  negative 
autocorrelation in the estimated return series, and leads to a much more accurate estimator when 
the number of observations is relatively small (Goetzmann, 1992). 
A good approximation of the annual arithmetic returns is then given by  ) 2 ˆ ˆ exp(
2
t t     
where the cross-sectional variance of the return can be estimated in the second stage of the Case-
Shiller repeat-sales regression under the assumption that it is constant over time (Goetzmann, 
1992). This specification corrects for a downward bias of the arithmetic mean that is due to the 
log transformation of the art prices. The return estimates can then be used to build a price index 
over the period of interest. 
   We perform the analysis outlined in the previous paragraph using our dataset of repeated 
sales. All prices were deflated using the U.K. RPI (Officer, 2009b) before the log transformation. 
(We start from real prices because the Bayes repeated sales estimator assumes that the returns   15 
conform  to  a  prior  distribution,  which  is  more  realistic  in  the  context  of  real  returns.)  The 
resulting art price index, in real British pounds, is shown in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
A visual inspection of the figure suggests a relationship between the real economy and art 
prices.  For  example,  we  see  significant  price  drops  during  World  War  I,  over  the  Great 
Depression in the 1930s, and after the oil crisis in 1973. There is no such an effect over the 
Second World War, when the price level was already the lowest of the whole twentieth century. 
Consistent with previous studies that have investigated the late twentieth century art market, we 
find strong price appreciations throughout the 1960s, during the art market boom at the end of 
the 1980s (until 1990), and in the 2000s (until 2007). In the nineteenth century, we observe 
strong price rises  in  the decades  leading up to  the so-called “Long  Depression” that started 
around 1873. We will henceforward refer to the natural log of our art price index as Art. Our 
analysis will focus on the period after 1830, the first year for which all the necessary economic 
data are available.   
 
4.2. Equity and income data 
 
We build a history of British stock price returns, based on the following sources: Acheson et al. 
(2009)  for  the  period  1830-1870,  Grossman  (2002)  for  the  period  1870-1900,  and  Dimson, 
Marsh, and Staunton (2002, 2009) for the years thereafter. We create yearly indices covering 
total return, capital appreciation, and dividend yield, transformed into real terms by deflating 
using the U.K. RPI (Officer, 2009b). We call the natural log series Equities, Equities (capital), 
and Equities (dividends). 
A recent literature has investigated the evolution of top incomes over the course of the 
twentieth century. Piketty and Saez (2006) document that the general pattern is one of a decline 
of top income in the inter-war period (mainly due to a decline of top capital income), and a 
sudden rise in top income in the Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1970s (mainly caused by a rise 
of top wages, i.e. executive compensation, in those countries). We use data from Atkinson and 
Piketty (2010) – who themselves rely on income tax data – to build a consistent series of the   16 
share of total income received by the top 0.1% of all income earners in the U.K. for the period 
1908-2005.
6 This series will be referred to as  Inequality. We refer to Atkinson (2007) for more 
details on data sources and methodology. However, it is important to note that the data exclude 
most capital gains and losses, and certain remunerations in kind. Part of the investment income 
will thus be captured by the equity capital appreciation variable presented before.  
Atkinson (2007) observes that the time trends in the distribution of income among the 
employed  and  the  distribution  of  personal  wealth  among  individuals  are  similar.  This  is 
important in our context for two related reasons. First, it suggests that we are measuring the share 
of income earned by the wealthy. Second, it indicates that, by measuring (changes in) inequality 
in the income distribution, we also proxy for (changes in) inequality in the distribution of wealth. 
We also use the data on the total personal income from Atkinson and Piketty (2010) for 
the years 1908-2005. The natural log of the deflated series is called Income. We calculate a 
similar series Top income that measures the log amount earned by the top 0.1% in every year. 
Yearly data on an alternative measure of total income, namely real GDP, come from Officer 
(2009a). The data are available from 1830 to 2007, and the logged series is labeled as GDP. Due 
to  relatively stable population  growth,  the variation  in  changes  in  total  income  over time is 
mainly driven by fluctuations in average income, just like in our simulation model. 
 
4.3. Tests for stationarity, descriptive statistics, and correlations 
 
As is well known, relating non-stationary series to each other would lead to spurious results. 
Therefore, we first want to determine whether our series are stationary or not. Table 1 shows the 
results of our Dickey-Fuller tests, which test for the existence of a unit root in time series. Next 
to  the  test  statistics  for  the  standard  Dickey-Fuller  test,  we  also  report  the  results  for  an 
                                                 
6 Data on the top 0.1% income share are missing for a limited number of years. For the period 1908-1912, we 
estimate the share of the top 0.1% based on the coefficients of a linear regression model without intercept that 
relates the top 0.1% share to the top 0.05% and top 0.01% shares. The model was estimated based on the period 
1913-1922. We estimate a similar model relating the top 0.1% share to the top 1% and top 0.5% shares using data 
from the periods 1982-1986 and 1993-1997 to get estimates of the top 0.01% for the 1987-1992 time frame. For the 
years 1961 and 1980 we linearly interpolated the income share based on the shares in the surrounding years.    17 
augmented  version  with  one  lagged  difference,  which  accounts  for  potential  higher-order 
autocorrelation. In each case, the null hypothesis is that of a unit root, or non-stationarity.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
  The results in Table 1 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis for all our original 
time series, implying that we cannot exclude non-stationarity. However, when considering the 
first differences in our time series, which measure the rate of change or indeed the return, we are 
able to reject non-stationarity at very high significance levels. This indicates that our series are 
integrated of order one; henceforward, we will thus mainly work with the first differences of the 
variables of interest.  
  Table  2  gives  the  descriptive  statistics  for  these  first  differences.  For  art,  we  see  an 
average annual log return of 3.20% over the period 1830-2007, with a standard deviation of 
almost 11%; for equities the mean is 6.51%, with a standard deviation of more than 15%. As can 
be expected, we find much lower volatility in the series measuring the changes in GDP and total 
income. The average first difference in Inequality is small (-0.06%), but the standard error is 
0.32%, indicating some variation in this variable. We also include the regression results of an 
autoregressive model with two lags in Table 2, to measure autocorrelation in the first differences. 
One can see that several  of our first-differenced variables have highly significant  first-order 
autocorrelation in returns. We will have to take this into account in our empirical analysis. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
  Table 3 gives an overview of the pairwise correlations between the different variables. 
The returns on art have a significantly positive correlation  with  the total  equity returns and 
capital  growth  in  equities,  and  with  changes  in  GDP.  We  also  witness  a  strong  positive 
correlation  between  art  returns  and  changes  in  income  inequality,  and  a  weaker  positive 
correlation between the first differences in art prices and those in top income. Note that there is 
also a highly significant positive correlation between Δ Equities (and both of its components) and 
Δ Inequality, even though the latter measure does not include capital gains. This may be due to 
business cycle effects, for example. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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5. Empirical results  
 
The results of our comovement analysis are outlined in subsection 5.1. First, we look at the 
relation  between  the  equity  market  and  the  art  market.  Second,  we  consider  the  correlation 
between changes in income inequality and art returns. Third, we combine equity returns and 
changes at the top of the income distribution into a single analysis. Thereafter, we undertake a 
cointegration analysis in subsection 5.2, to investigate whether we can identify a long-run driver 




The data series constructed in Section 4 enable a long-term view on the relationship between art 
prices and equity markets. Panel A of Table 4 outlines the baseline OLS regression results. 
Model (1) relates our art market returns to yearly changes in our measure of income for which 
we have information since 1830, namely GDP. We thereafter include equity market returns in 
our analysis. However, since the price of an equity is a „stock‟ variable measured at year-ends 
(and  thus  not  a  „flow‟  variable  like  GDP  or  dividends),  we  also  include  the  lagged  first 
differences for both Equities and Equities (capital). Models (2) and (3) look at overall equity 
returns, while models (4) and (5) differentiate between capital growth and dividend yield. We 
present  Newey-West  standard  errors  that  account  for  heteroskedasticity  and  first-order 
autocorrelation  in  the  error  terms  (which  is  signaled  by  (non-reported)  Durbin-Watson  test 
statistics). We also show the number of observations and F-value for each regression. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  The results for the estimation of model (1) in Panel A indicate that overall income does 
not explain art price changes at a meaningful statistical significance level. The coefficient on Δ 
GDP is positive, but has a p-value of slightly more than 0.10. It is possible that the low variation 
in GDP changes makes it hard to identify the effect of changes in total income. Models (2) and 
(3) in Panel A of Table 4 show positive coefficients on both same-year and lagged equity market   19 
returns that are statistically significant. The results of model (4) and (5) show that it is mainly 
lagged capital gains / losses that drive art returns.  
  Up to now, we have found strong evidence that capital  appreciation and depreciation 
drive  art  prices,  but  only  very  weak  evidence  that  a  proxy  for  overall  income  is  helpful  in 
explaining art price trends. However, delving deeper into the relation between income inequality 
and art prices, we report in panel B of Table 4 the results of additional regression models linking 
art returns to alternative proxies for both total income and its distribution. We limit our analysis 
to the period since 1908, the first year for which data on the income distribution are available. 
As before, models (1) and (2) indicate that changes in overall income variables (such as 
GDP or total personal income) are not statistically significantly related to art returns. Models (3) 
and (4) add the first differences in Inequality to the regression specification, and in both cases we 
find  positive  and  highly  significant  coefficients,  indicating  that  art  prices  rise  when  income 
inequality goes up, in line with our simulation model.
7 The inequality coefficient in model (4) 
suggests that a one percentage point increase in the share of total income earned by the top 0.1% 
triggers an increase in art prices of about  14 percent. Model (5) relates art price changes to the 
changes in Top income, the variable that combines information on personal income and income 
inequality. We observe a positive relation, but the coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero (t-statistic of 1.58). Also here this may be due to the relatively low year-to-year variation. A 
cointegration analysis below sheds more light on the long-run relationship between top income 
and art prices.  
  In models (1) and (2) of Panel C of Table 4, we check whether our inequality measure 
retains its explanatory power when controlling for same-year and lagged equity capital growth 
variables. We exclude the dividend variable, because dividends  are  very  sticky,  and  already 
captured by the personal income inequality variable. We still control for total income employing 
the different proxies presented above. Model (3) revisits the changes in top incomes.  
                                                 
7 We also re-estimated our models in Panels B and C adding the squares of Δ Inequality, to allow for the possibility 
of higher-order effects. This may be relevant since our inequality measures measure the curvature of the income 
distribution. However, in all cases the coefficients on  Δ Inequality were still significantly positive and in the same 
order of magnitude as those reported in Table 4. In contrast, the coefficients on the quadratic terms were never 
statistically significant from zero at the 5% level.    20 
The results from the three models in Panel C confirm our previous findings, in that equity 
markets strongly affect art prices. However, although the coefficient is somewhat smaller, our 
income inequality measure is still a highly significant determinant of the art price level. We find 
less support for the hypothesis that art returns can readily be associated with short-term changes 
in top incomes.  
We illustrate the trends in total personal income, the share held by the top 0.1%, and art 
prices since 1908 in Figure 3. This figure shows that art prices were lingering below the pre-
World War I level until the very end of the 1960s. If we only consider total income measures, 
this is quite surprising. Indeed, total personal income had by then increased almost fourfold – 
would one not expect rises in income to lead to an upward art price trend? The results presented 
here suggest that the changes in the income distribution may have played an important role: the 
share of total  income earned by the top  0.1%  decreased  enormously in the first  half of the 
twentieth century, potentially eroding the buying power of the wealthiest. 




Our previous observations provide evidence of comovement between equity markets and income 
inequality  on  the  one  hand  and  art  markets  on  the  other.  However,  this  analysis  has  been 
concentrated on relatively short-term effects. The long-term nature of our data series and the fact 
that the series are integrated of order one call for further exploration of the factors that drive art 
prices over the long run. If it is really the wealthy or high-income individuals that determine the 
price level in the art market, then one would expect Top income (but not necessarily GDP or 
Income) to be cointegrated with art prices. 
  Panel A of Table 5 shows the results of Johansen‟s cointegration tests applied to our time 
series over the period since 1908. We report the results of the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
tests assuming no trend in the cointegrating equation. We include one lagged first difference in 
our test, which seems reasonable given that we are working with yearly data. Also, lag selection 
criteria, like the Akaike Information Criterion or the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (not reported),   21 
suggest the inclusion of just one lag in most cases. Table 5 presents both the results with and 
without lagged equity capital growth as an exogenous variable. We find that the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration cannot be consistently rejected, except in the case of Top income. This is in 
line with the intuition behind our simulation model. Over the long run, the income of the wealthy 
seems the key factor in the price formation in the art market.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
  Panel B of Table 5 shows the resulting cointegrating equations, in which the coefficients 
are  normalized,  which  is  a  standard  procedure  that  allows  better  insight  in  the  interaction 
between the variables. Setting the coefficient on Art equal to one, we find significantly negative 
coefficients on Top income, in line with expectations. However, note that the absolute values of 
these coefficients are also significantly smaller than one, implying that there is no one-to-one 
relationship between our proxy for top incomes and art prices.  
   
6. Robustness checks  
 
This section includes a number of robustness checks. First, we add lagged art returns to our 
comovement models (subsection 6.1). Second, to test the robustness of our cointegration results, 
we repeat the analysis, but now adding a linear trend to the cointegrating equation (subsection 
6.2). Third, we do a comovement analysis by subperiod, before and after the end of the Second 
World War (subsection 6.3). Fourth, and last, we check whether our baseline results still hold 
after adding information on the American income distribution to our analysis (subsection 6.4).  
 
6.1. Adding lagged art returns to comovement models 
 
We previously reported strong autocorrelation in our returns on art. There are several possible 
reasons for this. First, the repeat-sales regression is known to induce serial dependency, and the 
shrinkage estimator used to construct the index may also have this effect (Goetzmann, 1992). 
Second, autocorrelation may be explained by speculative dynamics also relevant in other asset   22 
markets (Cutler et al., 1991). Third, it may also partially be attributable to a „Working effect‟ 
(Working, 1960; Schwert, 1990): our index is smoothed and will have autocorrelated returns by 
construction due to the implicit averaging of art prices per period. Therefore, as a first robustness 
check, we add the lagged art market return to some crucial comovement regressions from the 
previous section. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 6. Models (1), (2), and (3) repeat key 
regressions from Panels A, B, and C of Table 4, respectively. Durbin-Watson test statistics (not 
reported) indicate that the error terms no longer show significant autocorrelation, and therefore 
we report traditional robust (instead of Newey-West) standard errors.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
  Even though the lagged art returns are highly significant in all specifications of Table 6, 
the coefficients of the equity related variables and their significance are largely similar to those 
in Table 4. Also the coefficient on Δ Inequality in model (2) of Table 6 is still very strongly 
significant. In model (3) the coefficient on the income inequality variable is positive and more 
than a standard deviation above zero, albeit not statistically significant (p-value of 0.14). We 
conclude  from this  analysis  that including lagged art market  returns  somewhat  weakens  our 
results, but does not lead to different conclusions. 
 
6.2. Adding a linear trend to cointegrating equations 
 
In Section 5, we reported the results of a cointegration analysis that assumed no trend in the 
cointegrating equation. We now repeat this analysis adding such a linear trend. The results can 
be  found  in  Panel  B  of  Table  6.  As  before,  we  find  statistically  significant  evidence  of  a 
cointegrating relationship between top incomes and art prices. The cointegrating equations (not 
reported)  show  highly  significant  coefficients  on  Top  income  of  about  -0.50,  while  the 
coefficients on the time trend are not statistically significant.  
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6.3. Analysis per subperiod 
 
Profound changes have taken place in the art market since the middle of the previous century. 
Without doubt, the art market has become more globalized. One may thus expect the relation 
between  our  art  price  index  on  the  one  hand  and  the  British  equity  market  and  income 
distribution on the other to be weaker after the Second World War. Therefore, Panel C of Table 6 
repeats the same comovement analyses as before, but now differentiates between the period prior 
to 1945 and the post-war period. 
  Models (1) and (4) in Panel C show that (lagged) British equity capital growth has a 
statistically significant impact on our art price index for both subperiods. This is reassuring: at 
least for our analysis of the impact of equity markets, our results are not driven by one particular 
era. The other models, however, suggest that our findings on the role of income inequality in the 
determination of art prices are caused by trends in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Indeed, the coefficient on Δ Inequality is significantly positive and economically large in model 
(2), which considers the period up to 1945, but close to zero in model (5). Models (3) and (6) 
combine the information on income and equities. Although for the first subperiod we do not find 
any statistical significance, all coefficients have the expected sign and order of magnitude. The 
low power probably originates from the limited number of yearly observations. The results for 
the second subperiod, since World War II, confirm the points made earlier in this paragraph: 
equity markets have a clear impact, while we do not find evidence of a role for changes in the 
income distribution in setting art prices. 
  As  discussed  earlier,  comovement  analyses  investigate  short-term  effects.  The  much 
lower variation in changes in income inequality since 1945 may make it harder to identify those 
effects. It may still be the case that personal income and its distribution over the population are 
driving art prices over the longer term. Therefore, we also repeat the cointegration analysis for 
the post-war period. The results are reported in Panel D of Table 6.  
  Panel D shows that equities and GDP cannot be identified as long-term determinants of 
art prices, in line with our previous findings. In contrast, we cannot reject the hypotheses that 
total personal income and top incomes (in three out of four cases) are cointegrated with art 
prices. That both of these income series seem relevant since the end of World War II should not   24 
be too surprising. It became clear from the simulation exercise that art prices can be expected to 
move in line with overall income as long as there are no strong shocks in income inequality. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the strongest shifts in income distribution occurred in 
the first decades. 
 
6.4. Role of U.S. income distribution 
 
We perform a final robustness analysis incorporating data on income and income inequality in 
the United States. Americans have been one of the most important groups of art collectors in the 
global art market over the whole twentieth century. As before, the data come from Atkinson and 
Piketty (2010) and are available as of 1913. Δ Income U.S. and Δ Inequality U.S. refer to the 
newly introduced American data. In some specifications, we also control for GBP-denominated 
U.S. equity capital returns, using NYSE data from Goetzmann et al. (2001) for the pre-1925 
period and from CRSP for the period after. The results are shown in Panel E of Table 6. Model 
(1) considers the comovement of art returns with U.S. income and income inequality. Model (2) 
and (3) add British income and equity variables. Model (4) combines U.S. income, inequality, 
and equity prices. Model (5) adds all British information.  
  We find that there is a significant correlation between American income inequality and 
art returns in model (1), but that the significance of the coefficient disappears once British data 
are  added  in  models  (2)  and  (3).  Something  similar  happens  in  models  (4)  and  (5):  lagged 
American equity capital growth is a significant factor until British variables are added to the 
model. That the British income inequality and lagged equity capital appreciation variables are 
significant factors in the determination of British art prices in models (3) and (5) show that our 
results are robust, and hint at some country-specificity in the relationship between economic 
fundamentals and art prices, even in a globalized world.
8    
                                                 
8  Renneboog  and  Spaenjers  (2009b)  reach  similar  conclusions  after  studying  the  market  for  Russian  art.  For 
example, over the period 1997-2007, they find much higher correlations between the Russian stock market and 
prices  for  Russian  art  than  between  this  Russian  art  index  and  other  stock  markets.  Also,  anecdotal  evidence 




Motivated by a growing literature on stock market wealth effects and the effects of income 
dispersion  on  the  prices  of  real  assets,  this  article  has  investigated  how  investment  and 
employment income – more generally, money – determines the price of art. On a theoretical 
level, our simulation exercise shows how art prices rise not only when average or total income 
(or the size of the population) goes up, but also when income inequality rises. The evolution of 
the highest incomes may thus be important in driving art market trends. Empirically, we are able 
to confirm and strengthen previous evidence that equity market movements affect art prices, 
using a newly constructed art price index. This result is robust to many different specifications 
and holds even when we split the overall 1830-2007 time frame in two subperiods. We find 
weaker evidence for the impact of income inequality. Although there is evidence that changes in 
income inequality had an important effect on British art prices in the first half of the twentieth 
century, and that this effect is significant for the overall time frame, we do not confirm the result 
for  the  post-war  period.  Arguably  more  important,  however,  is  that  we  find  cointegrating 
relationships between top incomes and art prices, both for the total 1908-2005 period and since 
1945. 
  Taken together, these results demonstrate that it is indeed the wealth of the wealthy that 
drives art prices. This implies that we can expect art booms whenever income inequality rises 
quickly.  This  seems  exactly  what  we  witnessed  during  the  last  period  of  strong  art  price 
appreciation, 2002-2007. Indeed, in many countries with large numbers of art buyers, income 
inequality has risen significantly in those years, mainly due to strong increases in managerial 
compensation. Andy Warhol, for one, would probably have applauded this evolution: “I don‟t 
think everybody should have money. It shouldn‟t be for everybody – you wouldn‟t know who 
was important” (Warhol, 1975). 
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Table 1: Tests for stationarity 
Period
DF ADF(1) DF ADF(1)
Art 1830-2007 -1.062 -1.742 -8.642 *** -7.575 ***
Equities 1830-2007 -2.568 -2.727 -13.065 *** -10.030 ***
Equities (capital) 1830-2007 -2.556 -2.716 -13.090 *** -10.052 ***
Equities (dividends) 1830-2007 -0.173 -0.906 -6.642 *** -6.634 ***
GDP 1830-2007 -1.148 -2.059 -9.294 *** -8.264 ***
Income 1908-2005 -1.460 -1.557 -4.830 *** -3.982 ***
Inequality 1908-2005 -1.913 -2.573 -6.089 *** -5.607 ***
Top income 1908-2005 0.362 -0.141 -5.328 *** -4.063 ***
First differences Original series
 
Notes.  This  table  presents  the  Dickey-Fuller  test  statistics  of  the  original  series  and  their  first  differences.  Art  is  a  newly 
constructed annual art price index based on repeated sales data from Reitlinger (1961) and the Art Sales Index. Equities is an 
index capturing total returns on British equities, based on Acheson et al. (2009), Grossman (2002), and Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton  (2002,  2009).  Equities  (capital)  and  Equities  (dividends)  cover  capital  appreciation  and  dividend  yield  on  British 
equities, based on the same sources. GDP data come from Officer (2009a). Income is equal to total personal income in the U.K. 
Inequality is the share of total income earned by the top 0.1% income earners in the U.K. Top income is the amount of income 
earned by the top 0.1% income earners. Data on income and income inequality come from Atkinson and Piketty (2010). The 
price and income series are deflated using inflation data from Officer (2009b) and log transformed. More information on the data 
can be found in Section 4. In each case, we show the results of a standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) test and of an augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test including one lag. For all original series, we compare with the critical values with trend. We do not assume 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Period Mean S.D. Min Max L1 L2
Δ Art 1830-2007 0.0320 0.1077 -0.3520 0.3248 0.4197 *** -0.0515
0.1023 0.0903
Δ Equities 1830-2007 0.0651 0.1563 -0.8189 0.6820 0.0125 -0.0838
0.1685 0.1107
Δ Equities (capital) 1830-2007 0.0216 0.1579 -0.8948 0.6249 0.0106 -0.0851
0.1679 0.1112
Δ Equities (dividends) 1830-2007 0.0211 0.0555 -0.1290 0.2745 0.6591 *** -0.1105
0.1258 0.1127
Δ GDP 1830-2007 0.0196 0.0288 -0.1031 0.0947 0.3700 *** -0.0935
0.1227 0.0864
Δ Income 1908-2005 0.0623 0.0581 -0.1415 0.2237 0.5655 *** 0.0689
0.1569 0.1299
Δ Inequality 1908-2005 -0.0006 0.0032 -0.0121 0.0099 0.2461 -0.1708
0.1557 0.1845
Δ Top income 1908-2005 0.0547 0.0846 -0.1353 0.3451 0.4645 *** 0.1081
0.0888 0.1096  
Notes.  This  table  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  (mean,  standard  deviation  (S.D.),  minimum,  and  maximum)  of  the  first 
differences of our variables. The variables are defined below Table 1. L1 and L2 show the coefficients and robust standard errors 
of an AR(2) model that relates the first differences to the lagged first differences. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.   32 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
Δ Art Δ Eq. Δ Eq. (cap.) Δ Eq. (div.) Δ GDP Δ Inc. Δ Ineq. Δ Top
Δ Art 1.0000
Δ Equities 0.1763 ** 1.0000
Δ Equities (cap.) 0.1849 ** 0.9980 *** 1.0000
Δ Equities (div.) 0.0988 0.4352 *** 0.4333 *** 1.0000
Δ GDP 0.1670 ** 0.1032 0.1136 -0.0457 1.0000
Δ Income -0.0157 -0.1859 * -0.1943 * -0.8164 *** 0.1466 1.0000
Δ Inequality 0.3438 *** 0.3239 *** 0.3305 *** 0.3389 *** 0.1325 -0.2271 ** 1.0000
Δ Top income 0.1721 * 0.0421 0.0396 -0.3850 *** 0.1655 0.5698 *** 0.5588 *** 1.0000
 
Notes. This table presents the pairwise correlations for the first differences of our variables. The variables are defined below Table 1. All 
correlations except those involving the first differences in Income, Inequality, and Top income (1908-2005) are calculated over the time frame 
1830-2007. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   33 
Table 4: Comovement analysis  
 
Panel A: Art and equity markets (since 1830) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art
Δ GDP 0.6258 0.2929 0.2774
0.3853 0.3970 0.3917
Δ Equities 0.1189 * 0.1133 *
0.0641 0.0634
Δ(-1) Equities 0.2113 *** 0.1976 ***
0.0517 0.0550
Δ Equities (capital) 0.1252 * 0.1163
0.0732 0.0725
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) 0.2114 *** 0.1978 ***
0.0537 0.0574
Δ Equities (dividends) -0.0092 0.0116
0.2080 0.2052
Number of obs. 177 176 176 176 176
F-value 2.64 9.09 *** 6.12 *** 6.88 *** 5.31 ***  
 
Panel B: Art and income (since 1908) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art
Δ GDP 0.8027 0.6322
0.5199 0.4602
Δ Income -0.0344 0.1438
0.2849 0.2592
Δ Inequality 12.9007 *** 14.3493 ***
3.3648 4.1834
Δ Top income 0.2587
0.1635
Number of obs. 99 97 97 97 97
F-value 2.38 0.01 8.38 *** 7.60 *** 2.50  
 
Panel C: Art, income, and equity markets (since 1908) 
(1) (2) (3)





Δ Inequality 8.7570 ** 9.5855 **
3.8380 4.1283
Δ Top income 0.1626
0.1565
Δ Equities (capital) 0.0950 0.1086 0.1458 *
0.0738 0.0701 0.0743
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) 0.1927 *** 0.2070 *** 0.2265 ***
0.0620 0.0631 0.0574
Number of obs. 96 96 96
F-value 6.90 *** 8.16 *** 5.90 ***  
 
Notes. This table shows the results of comovement regressions. The returns on art are regressed on 
a constant and a changing set of independent variables, listed in the first column. The variables are 
defined below Table 1. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Below each coefficient 
is the Newey-West standard error, taking into account first-order autocorrelation in the error structure. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   34 
Table 5: Testing for cointegrating relationships 
 
Panel A: Johansen's cointegration tests (since 1908) 
Exogenous variable
Trace Max. Eigenval. Trace Max. Eigenval.
Equities 5.6742 5.6616
Equities (capital) 8.2766 8.2750
GDP 7.2942 7.2465 7.4525 7.4044
Income 10.1755 9.5352 8.0594 7.5196
Top income 20.2675 *** 17.8214 ** 20.1233 *** 18.5579 ***
None Δ(-1) Equities (cap.)
 
Notes. This  panel shows the results of Johansen's cointegration tests. The variables are defined 
below Table 1.  In each case, the null hypothesis is that of no cointegrating relation.  No trend is 
assumed  in  the  cointegrating  equation.  The  test  statistics  of  both  the  trace  and  the  maximum 




Panel B: Cointegrating equations 
Exogenous variable None Δ(-1) Equities (cap.)
Normalized coeff. Normalized coeff.
Art 1.0000 1.0000
Top income -0.4059 *** -0.4045 ***
0.0664 0.0653  
Notes.  This  panel  shows  the  normalized  coefficients  in  the  cointegrating 
relationship between art and top income. The variables are defined below Table 1.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks 
 
Panel A: Comovement analysis including lagged art returns 
(1) (2) (3)
1830-2007 1908-2005 1908-2005
Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art
Δ GDP 0.0692
0.3486
Δ Income 0.0183 0.0895
0.2300 0.2369
Δ Inequality 9.6221 ** 5.7150
3.9087 3.8736
Δ Equities (capital) 0.1135 ** 0.1147 **
0.0542 0.0554
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) 0.1649 *** 0.1734 ***
0.0493 0.0596
Δ Equities (div.) -0.0109
0.1612
Δ(-1) Art 0.3438 *** 0.3562 *** 0.3164 **
0.0810 0.1102 0.1073
Number of obs. 176 96 96
R2 0.2459 0.2347 0.3206  
Notes. This table shows the results of comovement regressions. The returns 
on  art  are  regressed  on  a  constant  and  a  changing  set  of  independent 
variables, listed in the first column. The variables are defined below Table 1. 
All  models  are  estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares.  Below  each 
coefficient is the robust standard error. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel B: Cointegration analysis including trend in cointegrating equation 
Exogenous variable
Trace Max. Eigenval. Trace Max. Eigenval.
Equities 15.8616 10.5152
Equities (capital) 16.1153 11.1468
GDP 18.4915 11.2468 17.5318 10.7848
Income 23.2010 17.2622 * 21.4551 16.0473
Top income 25.6605 * 18.6019 * 26.1225 ** 19.8579 **
None Δ(-1) Equities (cap.)
 
Notes. This panel shows the results of Johansen's cointegration tests. The variables are defined 
below Table 1. In each case, the null hypothesis is that of no cointegrating relation. A linear trend is 
assumed  in  the  cointegrating  equation.  The  test  statistics  of  both  the  trace  and  the  maximum 
eigenvalue tests are reported. ***,  **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks (cont.) 
 
Panel C: Comovement analysis by subperiod (before and after 1945) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1830-1945 1908-1945 1908-1945 1945-2007 1945-2005 1945-2005
Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art
Δ GDP 0.0329 0.7858
0.4417 1.0055
Δ Income 0.3419 0.2478 -0.0436 0.1043
0.5735 0.5479 0.3772 0.3025
Δ Inequality 21.0694 ** 10.1098 1.8530 -1.5564
9.2915 11.5472 4.4696 5.2515
Δ Equities (capital) 0.2870 *** 0.3019 0.0266 0.0479
0.1378 0.2027 0.0568 0.0534
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) 0.2078 ** 0.2264 0.1513 ** 0.1919 ***
0.1066 0.1524 0.0600 0.0647
Δ Equities (div.) -0.0866 0.0852
0.2695 0.4675
Number of obs. 114 37 36 61 60 59
F-value 3.22 ** 7.37 *** 5.63 *** 3.51 ** 0.09 2.85 **  
Notes. This table shows the results of comovement regressions for two different subperiods (until 1945 and since 1945). 
The returns on art are regressed on a constant and a changing set of independent variables, listed in the first column. The 
variables are defined below Table 1. All models are estimated using ordinary least squares. Below each coefficient is the 
Newey-West standard error, taking into account first-order autocorrelation in the error structure. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel D: Cointegration analysis on post-war data 
Exogenous variable
Trace Max. Eigenval. Trace Max. Eigenval.
Equities 3.8718 3.8180
Equities (capital) 4.8334 4.4677
GDP 7.4998 7.4664 7.2402 7.1566
Income 16.1455 ** 15.8426 ** 14.7599 * 14.4027 **
Top income 12.8065 12.7460 * 14.0398 * 14.0333 *
None Δ(-1) Equities (cap.)
 
Notes. This panel shows the results of Johansen's cointegration tests. The variables are defined 
below Table 1. In each case, the null hypothesis is that of no cointegrating relation. No linear trend is 
assumed  in  the  cointegrating  equation.  The  test  statistics  of  both  the  trace  and  the  maximum 
eigenvalue tests are reported. ***,  **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Robustness checks (cont.) 
 
Panel E: Comovement analysis including U.S. data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1913-2007 1913-2005 1913-2005 1913-2007 1913-2005
Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art Δ Art
Δ Income U.S. 0.1764 0.1456 -0.0064 0.0049 0.0073
0.2001 0.1981 0.1598 0.1720 0.1580
Δ Inequality U.S. 5.1387 * 0.8583 0.9534 2.3071 0.8736
2.7483 2.8745 2.5514 2.9839 2.6057
Δ Equities (capital) U.S. 0.0825 -0.0519
0.0725 0.1044
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) U.S. 0.1636 ** 0.0375
0.0765 0.0944
Δ Income 0.1575 0.1919 0.1828
0.2629 0.2750 0.3016
Δ Inequality 13.2699 *** 7.7677 * 8.3915 *
4.2293 4.3895 4.3597
Δ Equities (capital) 0.1137 0.1395
0.0716 0.0865
Δ(-1) Equities (capital) 0.2146 *** 0.1956 **
0.0593 0.0790
Number of obs. 94 92 91 93 91
F-value 2.21 3.74 *** 5.42 *** 1.98 4.11 ***  
Notes. This table shows the results of comovement regressions. The returns on art are regressed on a 
constant and a changing set of independent variables, listed in the first column. The U.S. income and 
inequality data come from Atkinson and Piketty (2010); the U.S. equity data stem from Goetzmann et al. 
(2001) and CRSP. The other variables are defined below Table 1. All models are estimated using ordinary 
least squares. Below each coefficient is the Newey-West standard error, taking into account first-order 
autocorrelation in the error structure. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   38 
Figure 1: Simulation results 
 
Panel A    Panel B       
 
Panel C    Panel D 
 
Panel E  Panel F 
 
 
Notes. This figure shows the results of the simulation exercise outlined in Section 3. Scenario 1 (resp. 2) is that of decreasing  (resp. 
increasing) inequality. Panels A and B show the per capita income index and the average art price indices (on a logarithmic scale). Panels 
C and D show the evolution of the average private valuation, relative to total income, of the winning bidder, with the value in the first period 
put equal to 1. Panels E and F show the evolution of the average ratio of the price to the winning bidder’s private valuation.   
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Figure 2: Yearly art price index  
 
 
Notes. This figure shows the constructed annual art price index in real GBP for the period 1765-2007, on a logarithmic scale. The 
index value in 1765 is put equal to 1. The transaction data come from Reitlinger (1961) and the Art Sales Index. The index is 
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Figure 3: Art, Income, and Inequality  
 
 
Notes. This figure shows the evolution of the time series Art, Income, and Inequality since 1908. The variables are defined below 
Table 1. The values of Art  and Income in 1908 are put equal to 1; these series are plotted against the left-hand  side axis. In each 
year, the value of Inequality is equal to the percentage share of the top 0.1% income earners in total income; this series is read 
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